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"SUBSTANTIALLY LIMITED:" THE REPRODUCTIVE
RIGHTS OF WOMEN LIVING WITH HIVIAIDS
Lisa M. Keelst
Women living with HIVI AIDS are frequently marginalized because
of gender, health status, and, often, socioeconomic class. This
Article explores the tension between the law and reproductive rights
of women living with HIVIAIDS by analyzing both legal precedents
and the evolving public health understanding of HIVIAIDS and
reproduction. Of pivotal importance is the 1998 United States
Supreme Court's decision in Bragdon v. Abbott, 1 which, while
providing protection for people with HIVI AIDS under the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), inadvertently served to
perpetuate a damaging stigma against women with HIVI AIDS who
choose to reproduce.
This Article explores the societal and legal consequences of
Bragdon and examines the way in which the law is out of step with
medical advancements regarding HIVIAIDS treatment and motherto-child transmission. The Article also considers obstacles women
with HIVI AIDS face in medical contexts and their impact on the
choice to reproduce, while proposing measures to ameliorate these
problems. Finally, the Article considers the potential implications of
the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (ADAAA) and how it may
influence courts' future interpretations of Bragdon. It also discusses
why Congress, when passing the ADAAA, should have explicitly
t
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addressed Bragdon to combat the stigma surrounding HIVIAIDS and
reproduction.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 2009, a woman was six months pregnant in New York City. 2
She went to her normally scheduled prenatal appointment and was
tested for HIV. 3 She discovered that she not only had HIV but fullblown AIDS, having only six CD4 cells. 4 Panicked, her obstetrician
initially did not feel comfortable treating her in this condition. 5 The
woman then attempted to see an HIVI AIDS physician, and, after
sitting in the waiting room for hours, she was informed that the
doctor would not treat her because she was pregnant. 6 Ultimately,
with the help of a community-based organization, an infectious
disease specialist collaborated with the woman's obstetrician and,
together, they administered the proper prenatal and postnatal protocol
to prevent perinatal, or mother-to-child, transmission. 7 After a course
of antiretroviral (ARV) therapy and a caesarean section procedure,
the woman delivered a healthy, HIV-negative child. 8 While this
woman eventually received appropriate medical treatment, the
obstacles she overcame stem from a stigma surrounding HIVIAIDS
and reproduction.
Eleven years earlier, in 1998, the Supreme Court decided Bragdon
v. Abbott/ taking seemingly progressive steps to prevent this very
type of discrimination from occurring-discrimination against people
living with HIVI AIDS by denying them appropriate medical
treatment. 10 In Bragdon, Sidney Abbott, a woman living with HIV,
brought an action against her dentist, Randon Bragdon, under the
ADA, 11 because Bragdon refused to treat her in his office. 12 After the
2.
3.
4.

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

Telephone Interview with Michelle Lopez, Treatment Educator, Cmty. Healthcare
Network of New York City (Dec. 2, 2009) [hereinafter Lopez Interview].
/d.
/d. CD4 cells, also known as T cells, are part of the immune system that defends
against infection. When a person's CD4 cell count drops below 200, that person's
HIV has developed into AIDS. See Dep't of Health and Human Servs.: Ctrs. for
Disease Control and Prevention, Living with HIVIAIDS, http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/
resourceslbrochures/livingwithhiv.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2010).
See Lopez Interview, supra note 2.
See id.
See id.
/d.
524 u.s. 624 (1998).
See generally id. at 637, 641-46 (using a number of different sources to confirm that
HIV is a handicap that warrants statutory coverage).
42 u.s.c. §§ 12101-12213 (1990).
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lower courts granted summary judgment in favor of Abbott, 13
Bragdon appealed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear
the case! 4 The case posed two questions: (1) was Abbott's HIVpositive status considered a disability under the ADA?; 15 and, if so,
(2) could Bragdon have refused treatment if her HIV posed a "'direct
threat to the health or safety of others[?]'" 16 The Court, in an opinion
delivered by Justice Kennedy, held that Abbott's HIV-positive status,
although asymptomatic at the time, was considered a disability under
the ADA because it was "a physical ... impairment that substantially
limit[ed] one or more of [her] major life activities." 17
The Bragdon Court easily found that HIV was considered a
physical impairment under the regulations issued by the Department
of Health and Human Services. 18 However, in order to rise to the
level of a disability under the ADA, the impairment had to
substantially limit a major life activity. 19 After a lengthy analysis, the
Court subscribed to Abbott's argument that her HIV -positive status
substantially limited her ability to reproduce, 20 and that reproduction

12.
13.

14.
15.
16.
17.

18.

19.
20.

Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 629. Bragdon informed Abbott "of his policy against filling
cavities ofHIV-infected patients." !d.
The United States District Court for the District of Maine granted summary judgment
in favor ofp1aintiff, Abbott. Abbott v. Bragdon, 912 F.Supp. 580, 584 (D. Me. 1995),
aff'd, 107 F.3d 934 (1st Cir. 1997). The United States Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling. Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934, 937, 949
(1st Cir. 1997), vacated, 524 U.S. 624 (1998).
Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 628.
/d. at 630-631.
/d. at 648 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(3) (1990)).
/d. at 630. The 1990 ADA provides other provisions under which a person may be
considered to have a disability. In addition to having a physical impairment, one
could have a mental impairment that substantially limits a major life activity. 42
U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (2005). A person could have a record of a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits a major life activity. /d. § 12102(2)(B).
Moreover, if a person does not have a physical or mental impairment that substantially
limits a major life activity, but that person is regarded as having such an impairment,
the individual is considered to have a disability under the ADA. /d. § 12102(2)(C).
See Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 637. The Department of Health and Human Services'
definition of "physical impairment" is the same as that in the regulations set forth by
the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW), issued in 1977,
interpreting the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which has largely been incorporated into
the ADA. !d. at 632.
See id. at 637. "The statute is not operative, and the definition not satisfied, unless the
impairment affects a major life activity." !d.
See id. at 641. Abbott testified that she chose not to have a child specifically because
she had HIV. !d.
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was a "major life activity" for purposes of the ADA. 21 In his opinion,
Justice Kennedy qualified the Court's holding by noting that, while
the Court could have decided whether or not HIV substantially
limited other major life activities, its proverbial hands were tied to
decide the case on reproduction grounds specifically. 22 Justice
Kennedy explained:
Given the pervasive, and invariably fatal, course of the
disease, its effect on major life activities of many sorts
might have been relevant to our inquiry. [Abbott] and a
number of amici make arguments about HIV's profound
impact on almost every phase of the infected person's life.
In light of these submissions, it may seem legalistic to
circumscribe our discussion to the activity of reproduction.
We have little doubt that had different parties brought the
suit they would have maintained that an HIV infection
imposes substantial limitations on other major life activities.
From the outset, however, the case has been treated as one
in which reproduction was the major life activity limited by
the impairment. It is our practice to decide cases on the
grounds raised and considered in the Court of Appeals and
included in the question on which we granted certiorari. 23
The Court proceeded to deem reproduction a major life activity/4
the crux of the case rested upon whether Abbott's physical
impairment substantially limited reproduction. 25 By aligning itself
with the statutory framework provided in the 1990 ADA/6 the
Supreme Court held that the ADA protected Abbott because her HIVpositive status substantially limited her ability to reproduce. 27 While
Bragdon resulted in a fortuitous outcome, the reasoning behind it
contributed to divergent lower court findings. 28 Moreover, Bragdon
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

!d. at641.
!d. at 637-38.
!d. (citations omitted).
!d. at 639.
!d. at 639-40.
See id. at 629-32.
See id. at 624-25.
See infra Part II. Compare Blanks v. Sw. Bell Commc'ns, 310 F.3d 398 (5th Cir.
2002) (fmding that an HIV -positive male employee was not physically disabled under
the ADA), with Teachout v. New York City Dep't of Educ., No. 04 Civ. 945
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2006), 2006 WL 452022 (finding that a reasonable trier of fact
could conclude that HIV substantially limited a male employee's ability to reproduce).
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inadvertently supported the notion that women with HIVIAIDS
should not reproduce. 29
This Article discusses how the Bragdon reproduction standard not
only gave rise to legal inconsistencies but also allowed for further
stigmatization of women with HIVIAIDS who choose to reproduce.
This stigma has little basis in public health and perpetuates both
gender and socioeconomic discrimination. Part IT of this Article
discusses how Bragdon's reproduction standard influenced other
courts to view ADA protection of people living with HIVI AIDS
primarily in the context of reproduction, leading to divergent
results. 30 Part ill demonstrates how, regardless of lower courts'
interpretations, the reproduction standard did not fully reflect public
health reality in 1998 when Bragdon was decided. 31 Part IV
addresses how Bragdon's framework has become more and more
outdated in the context of current public health data. 32 Part V steeps
the discussion of law and public health in reality, addressing the
reasons why women with HIVI AIDS choose-or choose not-to
reproduce and the social determinants of health that play a role in
their medical care, or lack thereof. 33 It proceeds to propose
collaborative efforts that could be made between HIVIAIDS
physicians and obstetricians to provide optimal health care. Part VI
discusses potential legal solutions, and potential problems, posed by
the ADAAA, in protecting women with HIVIAIDS who reproduce. 34
Finally, Part VII reaffirms the notion that women with HIVIAIDS
should not be "substantially limited" from making their own
reproductive choices. 35
Public health scholars such as Lawrence Gostin and James Hodge
have articulated the need for feminist legal theory to address the
reality many women living with HIVI AIDS face:
Feminist theories, despite all of their degrees and
differences, agree that "the evaluation of medical practices
must give primary attention to the impact of such practices
on women-not just on individual women but on women as
a group, including especially disadvantaged women such as
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

See Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 639.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part V.
See infra Part VI.
See infra Part VII.
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poor women and women of color." ... [W]omen have been
viewed as "vectors" of disease who infect unsuspecting men
or children.
The rise of heterosexual and vertical
transmission of HIV was attributed in part to women. And
like other high-risk groups, HIV -positive women became
silent victims of the disease .... 36
This Article expounds upon this assertion by addressing how women
It seeks to remedy this
with HIVI AIDS are marginalized.
marginalization by proposing legal and jurisprudential changes that
support the notion that all women have the right to choose whether or
not to reproduce.
II.

COURTS' INCONSISTENT INTERPRETATIONS OF
BRAGDON'S REPRODUCTION STANDARD

By stating that having HIVIAIDS substantially limits a woman's
ability to reproduce, the Bragdon Court created a standard that
undercut its own goal-it invoked the ADA to protect a woman
living with HIV from being discriminated against in a medical
setting, but it simultaneously established a framework under which
medical professionals could discriminate against women with
HIVIAIDS in the context of reproduction. 37 When authoring the
Bragdon opinion, Justice Kennedy went out of his way to mention
that Bragdon could have been decided on grounds other than
reproduction, and that if another plaintiff had brought the case, he or
she could have argued that HIVI AIDS substantially limited a
different major life activity. 38 His view was correct; reliance on the
Bragdon reproduction standard does not sufficiently protect everyone
living with HIVIAIDS. Despite Justice Kennedy's intentions,
however, lower courts have largely adhered to the reproduction
standard when determining whether HIVI AIDS is a disability under
the ADA. 39
United States v. Happy Time Day Care Center, 40 a district court
case decided while Bragdon was in flux, 41 demonstrated the difficulty

36.

37.
38.
39.
40.

Lawrence 0. Gostin & James G. Hodge, Jr., Piercing the Veil of Secrecy in HIVIAJDS
and Other Sexually Transmitted Diseases: Theories of Privacy and Disclosure in
Partner Notification, 5 DUKEJ. GENDER L. & POL'Y 9, 70-71 (quoting Karen Lebacqz,
Feminism and Bioethics: An Overview, SECOND OPINION, Oct. 1991, at II, 12).
See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624,641,655 (1998).
Jd. at 637-38.
See, e.g., Cruz Carillo v. AMR Eagle, Inc., 148 F. Supp. 2d 142, 144 (D. P.R. 2001).
6 F. Supp. 2d 1073 (W.O. Wis. 1998).
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of using the reproduction standard for HIV/AIDS-related ADA
cases. 42 In Happy Time Day Care, a case alleging discrimination
against a five-year-old boy living with HIV, the court held that using
the reproduction standard then-posed by Bragdon43 would be
problematic. 44 It determined that "[t]he correct and more logical
application is to start by identifying those activities that are important
in the life of [the boy]. Procreation does not make this list.'"'5 Basing
its analysis on major life activities important to a small child, the
court ultimately determined that a genuine issue of material fact
existed as to whether the boy was disabled under the ADA because
his HIV substantially limited his ability to care for himself. 46
Consequently, it denied the defendants' motion for summary
judgment.47 While the Happy Time Day Care court rationally related
the facts of the matter to the goals of the ADA, the court may have
decided differently if the case had occurred a few months later. After
Bragdon, the court might have felt compelled to apply the
reproduction standard to this situation, and, consequently, it might
have found that the boy was not protected under the ADA.
Shortly after Bragdon was decided, one commentator recognized
how the case could produce problematic results in lower courts:
"[B]y basing its decision on the 'major life activity' of reproduction,
the Court creates a new category of individuals whom it will consider
disabled-a category that does not adequately protect those with
HIV ...." 48
This commentator's observation portends the
inconsistent and sometimes peculiar applications of the reproduction
standard established in Bragdon.
Some lower courts applied the reproduction standard broadly,
expanding the boundaries of the ADA beyond HIV/AIDS, to protect
anyone who encountered problems reproducing. 49 In HIV/AIDS41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

49.

The Supreme Court heard oral arguments for Bragdon on March 30, 1998, and
decided it on June 25, 1998. Happy Time Day Care was decided on April 13, 1998.
See Happy Time Day Care, 6 F. Supp. 2d at 1078-80.
Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934 (I st Cir. 1997), cert. granted, 524 U.S. 624 (1998).
Happy Time Day Care, 6 F. Supp. 2d at 1078-80.
!d. at 1080.
!d. at I 081.
/d. at 1084.
Christiana M. Ajalat, Note, Is HIV Really a "Disability"?: The Scope of the
Americans with Disabilities Act after Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998), 22
HARV. J.L. &PUB. POL'Y 751, 760 (1999).
See, e.g., LaPorta v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 163 F. Supp. 2d 758 (W.D. Mich. 2001)
(holding that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether a female
employee's infertility was a disability under the ADA and whether the woman's
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related cases, some courts found that Abbott's choice not to procreate
was the deciding factor in determining whether her HIV substantially
limited her major life activity of reproduction. 50 Therefore, courts did
not always find that people with HIVIAIDS were protected against
discrimination under the ADA. 5 1 For instance, in Blanks v. Southwest
Bell Communications, Inc., 52 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit affirmed a district court decision that a male plaintiff
living with HIV was not considered disabled under the ADA because
he and his wife had previously decided not to have children, and his
wife had undergone a procedure to prevent her from becoming
pregnant. 53 Similarly, in Gutwaks v. American Airlines, Inc., 54 a
district court ruled that a homosexual man living with HIV was not
disabled because, since he had no intention of having children, his
HIV did not limit a major life activity. 55 In both Blanks and Gutwaks,
if the plaintiffs had merely expressed a desire to have children before
being diagnosed with HIV, they would have been deemed disabled
under the ADA. 56 However, because these plaintiffs did not choose,
or at least express a desire, to reproduce, they somehow became less
worthy of protection and more vulnerable to discrimination.
Other courts have applied the reproduction standard differently. In
Teachout v. New York City Department of Education, 57 a district
court held that a plaintiffs HIV infection was a disability under the

50.
51.

52.
53.

54.
55.
56.
57.

employer was obligated to provide reasonable accommodations for her to receive
infertility treatment).
E.g., Worster v. Carlson Wagon Lit Travel, Inc., 353 F. Supp. 2d 257, 265-66 (D.
Conn. 2005).
Gutwaks v. Am. Airline, Inc., No. 3:98-CV-2120-BF, 1999 WL 1611328, at *4 (N.D.
Tex. Sept. 2, 1999); Cruz Carillo v. AMR Eagle, Inc., 148 F. Supp. 2d 142, 144-46
(D. P.R. 2001); Blanks v. Sw. Bell Cornmc'ns, Inc., 310 F.3d 398, 401 (5th Cir.
2002).
310 F.3d 398.
/d. at 401. The court stated that in Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471
(1999), the Court considered the "hemic and lymphatic" systems "major life
activities." Blanks, 310 F.3d at 401. However, the Sutton Court actually stated that
"[u]nder the regulations, a 'physical impairment' includes ' . . . anatomical loss
affecting one or more of the following body systems: ... hemic and lymphatic."' 527
U.S. at 479-480 (emphasis added). If the court had actually determined that the
proper functioning of the hemic and lymphatic systems were major life activities, it
may have found that the plaintiffs HIV substantially limited these systems and
therefore limited a major life activity.
1999 WL 1611328.
/d. at *4.
See Blanks, 310 F.3d at401; Gutwaks, !999 WL 1611328 at *4-5.
No. 04 Civ. 945, 2006 WL 452022 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2006).
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ADA because it substantially limited his ability to reproduce. 58 The
plaintiff in Teachout did not even mention the issue of reproduction
Nevertheless, the court applied the
during his deposition. 59
reproduction standard to his situation, stating that "the Supreme
Court has acknowledged the abundance of medical evidence showing
that the HIV infection substantially limits the ability to reproduce as a
general matter, and [plaintiff] is not required to reinvent that wheel in
response to [defendant's] motion for summary judgment." 60
Although the court acknowledged that the Bragdon Court had
declined to consider whether HIV was a disability per se, it
ultimately decided that the Bragdon Court made it clear that the
plaintiff should be protected under the ADA because his HIV
affected his physical ability to reproduce. 61
The Teachout court dispelled the notion that personal choice was
the determining factor, stating that "[i]t is not necessary for a plaintiff
to want to have children, or for a plaintiff to plan to have children, to
show that his ability to have children has been substantially limited
by infection with HIV."62
However, the court subsequently
distinguished personal choice from physical ability:
If, however, a plaintiff were to claim that his HIV infection
substantially limited his ability to reproduce, but the
evidence in the record showed that he was physically
incapable of reproduction for reasons unrelated to his HIVpositive status, such as a voluntary irreversible sterilization,
then in that case, the plaintiff would not have a disability
under the ADA. 63
While the court departed from the Blanks personal choice standard,
its interpretation of Bragdon was nevertheless problematic because it
excluded some people living with HIV/AIDS solely because they had
been physically unable to reproduce before having HIV. 64

58.
59.
60.
61.

62.
63.
64.

/d. at *8.
/d. at *7.
/d.
See id. at *7-8. The court also stated that plaintiff's "failure to mention reproduction
at his deposition is not evidence that he carries some previously unknown strain of the
disease, one that does not affect the ability to reproduce." /d. at *7.
/d. at *7.

/d.
See discussion infra Part IV (explaining the problematic nature of the Bragdon
standard).
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The aforementioned cases address discrimination allegations in
employment settings and some places of public accommodation, 65 but
courts have also applied the Bragdon standard in cases involving
HIVI AIDS-based discrimination in other places of public
accommodation, such as doctors' offices and hospitals. 66 Most
notably, the Bragdon standard was applied in Lesley v. Hee Man
Chie, 67 where a woman living with HIV brought a discrimination
claim against her obstetrician for transferring her to a different
hospital for prenatal care, labor, and delivery. 68 Here, the First
Circuit69 did not grapple with whether the plaintiff was disabled,
because the parties did not dispute this issue. 70 In fact, the court cited
Bragdon to conclude that "Lesley's HIV -positive status is a disability
for purposes of the [Rehabilitation] Act."71 The Lesley court's
reliance on Bragdon presented a peculiar dichotomy. It maintained
65.

66.

67.
68.

69.
70.
71.

The setting in Happy Time Day Care is considered a public accommodation. See 42
U.S.C. § 12181(7)(K) (2006) (defining day cares as public accommodations). Also,
most employers are covered entities under the ADA. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)
(2006). While this Article primarily discusses HIV/AIDS-related ADA discrimination
in medical settings, the discussed cases are relevant because this Article focuses on
the definition of disability under the ADA, which is the same in both employment
settings and other places of public accommodation.
See 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(F) (providing that public accommodations include a
"professional office of a health care provider, hospital, or other service
establishment").
250 F.3d 47, 56-57 (1st Cir. 2001).
The plaintiff sued under the 1990 ADA, section 504 of the 1973 Rehabilitation Act,
and the Massachusetts Public Accommodations Statute, but she ultimately stipulated
to dismissal of the ADA claim. !d. at 51. This case was decided under the
Rehabilitation Act because the hospital was a place that received federal funding.
Disability Rights Section, U.S. Department of Justice, A Guide to Disability Rights
Laws (Sept. 2005), available at http://www.ada.gov/cguide.htm. The court therefore
examined the definition of disability under the Rehabilitation Act. 29 U.S.C. § 701, et
seq. (1973). The Lesley court's use of the Rehabilitation Act as the ground upon
which to bring a disability claim does not diffuse the applicability of this case when
examining the ADA's definition of disability. Indeed, "[t]he ADA's definition of
disability is drawn almost verbatim from the definition of 'handicapped individual'
included in the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 . . . . Congress' repetition of a wellestablished term carries the implication that Congress intended the term to be
construed in accordance with pre-existing regulatory interpretations." Bragdon v.
Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 631 (1998). See also id. at 645 (stating that "repetition of the
same language [from the Rehabilitation Act] in a new statute [the 1990 ADA]
indicates, as a general matter, the intent to incorporate its administrative and judicial
interpretations as well.").
This court also decided Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934 (1st Cir. 1997), cert.
granted, 524 U.S. 624.
Lesley, 250 F.3d at 53.
!d. (citing Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 631).
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that the plaintiffs HIV substantially limited her ability to
reproduce. 72 However, the plaintiffs complaint centered on her
obstetrician's refusal to treat her like every other pregnant patient,
implying that her HIV status should not have affected her ability to
reproduce. 73 Put another way, the plaintiff defined herself as
substantially limited in reproducing, yet she wanted her obstetrician
not to view her as such when she was pregnant. 74 Thus, Lesley
epitomizes the incongruity of the reproduction standard, specifically
in situations when a woman with HIVIAIDS is attempting to
reproduce. 75
One commentator expounds upon this paradox when discussing
potential legal issues surrounding assisted reproductive technologies
(ARTs) for women with HIV/AIDS or other physical impairments
that hinder reproduction: 76
Under a narrow reading of Bragdon, a court might find that
a medical condition "substantially limits" reproduction for a
particular individual only if the condition's reproductive
risks lead that person to refrain from having children. If
proof of the specific plaintiffs unwillingness to reproduce is
necessary to establish a reproductive disability under
Bragdon, persons seeking to have children through ARTs

72.
73.
74.

75.
76.

See id. at 58.
See id. at 53.
The court ultimately decided that the doctor had not discriminated against the patient
because he transferred the patient to a hospital that was better versed in HIV -related
prenatal care in 1994, when the plaintiff was pregnant. See id. at 56. It distinguished
the case from Bragdon because the doctor did not try to argue that the patient's HIV
posed a direct threat to him or to others. See id. at 57. Rather, the court decided the
doctor's decision to transfer the patient was in the best interest of the patient, and no
discriminatory pretext existed in the case. See id. at 57-58.
See Ajalat, supra note 48, at 764-65 (stating that under the Bragdon standard, an
HIV -infected mother has a decisional disability and not a physical disability).
The term "assisted reproductive technologies" is also referred to as ARTs. Assisted
Reproductive Technology: Home, Ctrs. for Disease Control and Prevention, http://
www.cdc.gov/ART/ (last visited Mar. 9, 2010); see also Carl H. Coleman, Conceiving
Harm: Disability Discrimination in Assisted Reproductive Technologies, 50 UCLA L.
REv. 17, 19 (2002). The most common methods of ARTs have included assisted
insemination, assisted ovulation, and in vitro fertilization. Id. at 22-23 (citing N.Y.
STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE & THE LAW, ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES:
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PUBLIC POLICY

43-60 (1998)).
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could not claim they are disabled because they have medical
conditions associated with reproductive risks. 77
This scenario is quite circular. If a woman with HIV/AIDS would
like to reproduce, and a medical provider refuses to assist her, she
may have no recourse because she is specifically claiming that her
HIV status does not substantially limit her ability to reproduce. 78
Since her argument would not fall under the Bragdon reproduction
framework, a court might not find that she has a disability, and she
might not be protected under the ADA. This situation is clearly a
problematic one, one that undermines the precise purpose of the
ADA.
III. THE REPRODUCTION STANDARD FROM A 1998 PUBLIC
HEALTH STANDPOINT
The Bragdon Court stated that "an HIV -infected woman's ability to
reproduce is substantially limited in two independent ways: If she
tries to conceive a child, (1) she imposes on her male partner a
statistically significant risk of becoming infected; and (2) she risks
infecting her child during gestation and childbirth, i.e., perinatal
transmission."79 Reliance on these risks as the sole reasons why a
person with HIV/AIDS is disabled under the ADA is both misleading
and stigmatizing. 80 The Bragdon Court emphasized the importance
of looking to public health authorities to determine whether
Bragdon's refusal to treat Abbott in his dentist office was a
reasonable choice. 81 To follow the Bragdon Court's rationale, this
Article will examine HIVI AIDS and reproduction in the context of
public health.
A.

Partner Transmission Data: 1998

When discussing the risk of female-to-male partner transmission,
the Bragdon Court cited "[c]umulative results of 13 studies collected
in a 1994 textbook on AIDS" to conclude "that 20% of male partners
of women with HIV became HIV -positive themselves."82 The Court
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

82.

Coleman, supra note 76, at 35.
!d.
Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 625 (1998).
See discussion infra Part IV.
Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 650 ("In assessing the reasonableness of petitioner's actions, the
views of public health authorities, such as the U.S. Public Health Service, CDC, and
the National Institutes of Health, are of special weight and authority." (citing Sch. Bd.
of Nassau City v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 288 (1987))).
/d. at 639.
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emphasized the transmission risk women posed to men, when in
reality, according to public health data published in 1998, the very
year Bragdon was decided, "[t]he rate of transmission of HN from
male to female [was] two to three [times] higher than that from
female to male." 83 Both biological84 and socio-cultural gender
differences contributed-and still contribute-to this reality. 85 In the
United States:
From a biological perspective, women have an elevated
risk . . . of contracting disease within the context of a
heterosexual relationship .... This increased biological risk
also can be seen epidemiologically. Women currently
comprise one of the fastest growing groups of people with
HIVI AIDS, with increased infection rates seen most heavily
among minority women. 86
From a socio-cultural standpoint:
[W]omen are essentially at more risk because of the
conditions in cultures and communities that remove their
control over their own bodies. Women are often blamed
incorrectly as the source of HIV infection .... Conversely,
many more women are monogamous, but are at high risk
due to the sexual behavior of their male partner. 87
Even based on 1994 public health data, it is not at all clear that the
Bragdon Court's assumption that the risk of female-to-male
transmission during heterosexual intercourse substantially limits a
person's ability to reproduce. 88 Well before 1998, ARTs were
83.

84.

85.
86.
87.
88.

JAMES MCINTYRE, HIV IN PREGNANCY: A REVIEW 6, available at http://data.unaids.
org/Publications/IRC-pubOl/jc 151-hiv-in-pregnancy_en.pdf (written in conjunction
with a working group on HIV and pregnancy, composed ofstaffofthe World Health
Organization's Reproductive Health Programme and the Joint United Nations
Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS)). While this review provides an analysis of
women and HIVIAIDS in an international context, it demonstrates the reality in the
United States as well.
Biologically, in women, the "Langerhans' cells of the cervix may provide a portal of
entry for HIV and it has been suggested that some HIV serotypes may have higher
affinity for these, and therefore to be more efficient in heterosexual transmission." /d.
Jd.
Gostin & Hodge, supra note 36, at 68 (footnotes omitted).
MciNTYRE, supra note 83, at 7.
For a discussion of the Court's rationale, see Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 63940 (1998).
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considered viable options for women to reproduce without engaging
in sexual intercourse. 89 Consequently, a person with HIVIAIDS
could reproduce without posing any transmission risk to his or her
sexual partner. 90 Since ARTs were a proven method of alternative
reproduction prior to 1998, the Court's statement that "a woman
infected with HIV who tries to conceive a child imposes on the man a
significant risk of becoming infected" 91 does not necessarily hold
true. By focusing on this risky scenario alone, the Court opens up the
possibility for lower courts to perpetuate the idea that a woman with
HIVI AIDS is always placing her partner at risk by attempting to
reproduce.

B.

Perinatal Transmission Data: 1998

The Bragdon Court's focus on the risks of perinatal transmission
once again suggests a viewpoint that women with HIVIAIDS should
not reproduce. 92 Citing public health data from 1992 and 1994, the
Court stated that the risk of perinatal transmission was approximately
25%. 93 While the Court acknowledged that ARV therapy lowered the
risk to about 8%,94 it did not discuss whether the 25% figure or the
8% figure was the relevant statistic. Rather, according to the Court,
"[i]t cannot be said as a matter of law that an 8% risk of transmitting
a dread and fatal disease to one's child does not represent a
substantial limitation on reproduction." 95 Therefore, the Court
implied that, even when a woman with HIVI AIDS takes every
possible precaution, having HIVIAIDS would still substantially limit
her ability to reproduce.
A 1998 report of public health data confirmed that, if a woman
living with HIVI AIDS took no medicine or preventive measures, the
probability that she would have transmitted HIV to her child was
indeed approximately 25%. 96 However, in the early to mid-1990s,

89.
90.

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

See Assisted Reproductive Technology: Home, Ctrs. for Disease Control and
Prevention, http://www.cdc.gov/ART/ (last visited Mar. 9, 2010).
See CTR. FOR HIV LAW & POL'Y, HIV AND PREGNANCY: A GUIDE TO MEDICAL AND
LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR WOMEN AND THEIR ADVOCATES 16-17 (2009), available
at http://www.hivlawandpolicy.org/resources/view/474 (addressing ways in which
serodiscordant couples can conceive without transmission).
Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 639.
See id. at 640-41.
!d. at 640.
Id.
Petitioner, Bragdon mentions the 8% perinatal transmission rate when
antiretroviral therapy is used. Id.
!d. at 641.
MciNTYRE, supra note 83, at 9-10.
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ARV therapy was beginning to decrease this risk significantly. 97
During this time, public health authorities also began pinpointing
factors that contributed to perinatal transmission98 and steps a woman
could take before, during, and after pregnancy to prevent it. 99
C.

Bragdon and Public Health

By conclusively deciding that having HIVIAIDS substantially
limited a woman's ability to reproduce, regardless of preventive
measures, the Bragdon Court sidestepped the public health reality
present in 1998. 100 It did not mention the importance ofprenatal care
and prevention, and it consequently set a precedent in the United
States that the risks of reproducing would largely outweigh the
benefits. By focusing on the substantial limitation HIVIAIDS placed
on reproduction, 101 the Bragdon Court made a seemingly absolute
statement, and lower courts have yet to reconcile it with medical
advancements surrounding HIVIAIDS and reproduction.
Moreover, the Court's implicit suggestion that women with
HIVI AIDS should not reproduce has contributed to an atmosphere in
which women who would like to reproduce have been dissuaded
from following the proper care protocol, due to fear of stigma or
judgment. 102 This discouragement undercuts the advice of public
health authorities in the 1990s. 103 For example, in 1995, the Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) recommended that "HIVinfected women should receive information about all reproductive
options. Reproductive counseling should be nondirective. Health-

97.

98.
99.

100.

101.
102.
103.

"The estimated annual incidence of perinatal infections declined by 27% in the United
States between 1992 and 1995 after the widespread implementation of antiretroviral
therapy in pregnancy." Id. at 10 (citation omitted).
See id. at 10-15.
In fact, in 1998, public health authorities had already suspected that "successful use of
antiretroviral therapy ... has [led] to suggestions that it may eventually be possible to
reduce perinatal transmission rates to less than 2%." Jd. at 15-16 (citing Bryson Y.
Perinatal HIV -1 Transmission: Recent Advances and Therapeutic Interventions.
AIDS, 1996, 10 ((Supp. 3):S33-S42)). In addition to a consistent routine of ARV
therapy, other preventive measures identified in 1998 included a woman delivering
through a caesarean-section procedure and avoiding breast feeding. Jd. at 16.
See Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 660-63 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (emphasizing that the majority opinion was contrary to the sound studies of
public health authorities).
Id. at 641.
See infra Part IV.
Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 662-{)4 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).

404

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 39

care providers should be aware of the complex issues that HIVinfected women must consider when making decisions about their
reproductive options and should be supportive of any decision." 104
Meanwhile, the Bragdon Court believed that "[c]onception and child
birth are not impossible for an HIV victim but, without doubt, are
dangerous to the public health." 105 While it left open the possibility
that women living with HIVIAIDS could safely reproduce, its
conclusion implied that a woman with HIV who chooses to reproduce
is making a detrimental decision, regardless of personal
circumstances. 106
IV. RELIANCE ON THE BRAGDON STANDARD REMAINS
PROBLEMATIC TODAY
The Bragdon Court's obvious disapproval of the choice to
reproduce was perhaps more understandable given the public
perception of HIVIAIDS in 1998. However, while treatments to
prevent HIVIAIDS transmission have improved, the Bragdon Court's
framework remains static.
For well over the past decade,
advancements in HIVI AIDS treatment have reduced the risk of
partner and perinatal transmission. 107 Specifically, as predicted in the
late-1990s, the use of ARVs, combined with caesarian-section
delivery, has decreased the risk of perinatal transmission to below
2%. 108 In addition, HIVI AIDS is no longer considered an absolute
death sentence. 109 The use of ARVs has proven to extend the lives of
those living with HIV, in this case enabling mothers to live longer
lives and to care for their children. 110
The legal world's lack of progress regarding its view ofHIVIAIDS
and reproduction is problematic because it fails to incorporate the
104. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, U.S. Public Health Service Recommendations

for Human Immunodeficiency Virus Counseling and Voluntary Testing for Pregnant
Women, 44 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP., July 7, 1995, at 10, available at
www.cdc.gov/mmWR/PDF/rr/rr4407.pdf.
105.
106.

Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 641.
See id. (noting that "[t)he decision to reproduce carries economic and legal

consequences").
107. CTR. FOR HIV LAW & PoL'Y, supra note 90, at 4 (discussing the substantial decline in
perinatal HIV transmission between 1994 and 2005 as a result of ARVs).
108. !d. (citing Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Achievements in Public Health:
Reduction in Perinatal Transmission of HJV Infection-United States, 1985-2005, 55
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP 592 (2006)). Absent any intervention, the risk
of perinatal transmission remains at 25%. !d.
109. Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., Restoring the ADA and Beyond: Disability in the 21st
Century, 13 TEx. J. C.L. & C.R. 241, 319 (2008).
110. CTR. FOR HlV LAW & POL'Y, supra note 90, at 4.
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scientific evidence behind HNI AIDS transmission, 111 and it does not
combat discrimination against women with HNI AIDS. 112
As
expressed in this Article, women living with HNIAIDS have not
only been discouraged from reproducing, 113 but they also have
struggled to access comprehensive medical treatment when
pregnant. 114 This lack of medical care severely increases the chances
that a child will be born with HIV. 115
If a woman with HNI AIDS wants to reproduce and a doctor
refuses to treat her properly, it would be difficult for the woman, in
light of the Bragdon reproduction standard, to feel as though she has
an ally in the legal world. While the Bragdon Court stated that a
woman with HNI AIDS who reproduces creates a danger to the
public health, 116 the public health is compromised even more if the
woman does not receive the proper medical treatment because she is
frightened to disclose her HN status to her doctor. 117 For example,
the woman might decide not to mention her HN status to her
obstetrician and consequently not receive the appropriate prenatal
care. Unfortunately, this scenario is steeped in reality. According to
a Community Liaison at Children's National Medical Center, in
Washington, D.C., if HIVIAIDS doctors discourage women from
reproducing, some women will stop receiving HIVIAIDS treatment
and will seek prenatal care without ever mentioning their HIV status
to their obstetricians. 118

See infra Part V.
See Stop Violence Against Women: HIVIAIDS, Women, and Human Rights,
http://www.amnestyusa.org/womenlhivaids.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2010)
(explaining that women infected with HIV are often "socially ostracized" and that
"[d]iscrimination is integrally linked to women's experiences with HIV/AIDS").
113. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 641 (1998) (cautioning that conception for an
HIV victim is "dangerous to the public health").
114. See HIV & AIDS Stigma and Discrimination, http://www.avert.org/aidsstigrna.htm
(last visited Mar. 9, 2010). "In healthcare settings people with HIV can experience
stigma and discrimination such as being refused medicines or access to facilities .... "
Ill.
112.

/d.

115. CTR. FOR HIV LAW & PoL'Y, supra note 90, at 4. If perinatal transmission is "sharply
reduced" by prenatal care, then conversely, with no medical intervention, perinatal
transmission is more likely. See id.
116. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 641.
117. See CTR. FOR HIV LAW & PoL'Y, supra note 90, at 4; Gregory M. Herek et al., HIVRelated Stigma and Knowledge in the United States: Prevalence and Trends, 19911999, A..'\1. J. PUB. HEALTH, Mar. 2002, at 371, 376.
118. Telephone Interview with Ebony Johnson, Cmty. Liaison, Family Connections,
Children's Nat'l Med. Ctr., D.C. (Nov. 20, 2009).
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Situations such as this one have occurred and continue to occur
because of the stigma surrounding women living with HIVI AIDS
who would like to procreate. 119 The legal world has done little to
combat this stigma, both when Bragdon was decided, as well as
today. 120
By evading this reality, courts have established a
framework that is more damaging to the public health than it would
have been if the issue had been comprehensively addressed.
V. TRANSLATING REALITY INTO LAW
A.

Women with HIV/AIDS and the Choice to Reproduce

A legal structure that fully protects women with HIVIAIDS must
recognize that the choice to reproduce is a complicated one, but that
many women will either choose to reproduce or will have the choice
forced upon them. 121 Some women with HIVIAIDS want to
reproduce, seeing the decision to have children as central to their
womanhood. 122 At times, however, cultural and economic factors do
not always place women in full control of this decision. 123
Stigmatizing women with HIVIAIDS who give birth serves only to
marginalize them and further endanger the public health.
According to a 2009 study, 59% of women living with HIV 124
wanted to have a child, and the main reason for this desire was "'to
experience motherhood. "' 125 Likewise, in other studies, women
living with HIVIAIDS have cited both social and personal reasons for
wanting to procreate. 126 Culturally,
most Western societies encourage reproduction and
emphasize motherhood as a valued role for women ....
Pregnancy elevates a woman's status in some communities
and is often an opportunity for women to feel good about
themselves. Babies represent love, acceptance, and a legacy
119. See Herek eta!., supra note 117, at 371.
120. See id
121. See Karolynn Siegel & Eric W. Schrimshaw, Reasons and Justifications for
Considering Pregnancy Among Women Living with HJVIAJDS, 25 PSYCHOL. WOMEN
Q. 112, 115-16 (2001).
122. Jd at 117.
123. See Gostin & Hodge, supra note 36, at 68-69.
124. The women in the study were all of reproductive age (ages fifteen to forty-four).
Sarah Finocchario-Kessler et a!., Understanding High Fertility Desires and Intentions
Among a Sample of Urban Women Living with HIV in the United States, AIDS
BEHAv., Nov. 12, 2009, http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/19908135.
125. Jd Contrarily, having HIV was cited as the main reason not to have a child. ld
126. Siegel & Schrimshaw, supra note 121, at 116.
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for the future, even for a woman without a sense of future
for herself. 127
Put simply, for many women, motherhood epitomizes femininity. 128
Therefore, many women, with or without HIVI AIDS, choose the path
of reproduction at some point in their lives.
However, the decision to reproduce is not always that of the
woman, and access to timely and appropriate medical care is not a
given. 129 At times, a woman may have no true choice regarding
whether or not she becomes pregnant or carries her child to term.
Public health experts recognize that "[m]any women ... lack control
over their own exposure [to HIV and other sexually transmitted
infections] because of their inability to make critical life choices due
to poverty, domestic violence, and discrimination." 130 Likewise,
some women "lack the power in their relationships to require male
partners to refrain from sex or to use condoms." 131 This lack of
power and control can lead not only to sexually transmitted infections
but also to unintended pregnancy. Regardless of the situation, ample
evidence indicates that women with HIVI AIDS will continue to
become pregnant, whether planned or unplanned. 132 Given this
reality, the question of how medical and legal settings should adjust
remains to be answered.
B.

Social Determinants ofHealth: The Physician-Patient Power
Play

Society views HIVI AIDS as a taboo disease. Because primary
transmission methods include sexual intercourse and injection drug
use, some people feel that HIVI AIDS is caused by scandalous and
blame-worthy behavior. 133 The disease remains in the shadows of
127. Deborah Ingram & Sally A. Hutchinson, Double Binds and the Reproductive and
Mothering Experiences of HIV-Positive Women, 10 QUAL. HEALTH REs. 117, 118
(2000).
128. See id.
129. See infra Part V.B.
130. Gostin & Hodge, supra note 36, at 69; see also Jane Stoever, Stories Absent from the
Courtroom: Responding to Domestic Violence in the Context of HIV and AIDS,
N.Y.L. ScH. CLINICAL REs. INST., Research Paper Series No. 09/10 #2 (discussing the
correlation between HIV/AIDS and domestic violence).
131. Gostin & Hodge, supra note 36, at 69.
132. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, HIV/AIDS, Pregnancy & Childbirth, http://
www.cdc.gov/hiv/topics/perinatal/index.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 201 0).
133. See generally Herek et al., supra note 117, at 371 (discussing negative feelings toward
people with AIDS (PWAs), such as the "belief that they deserve their illness");
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society, distinguished from other serious diseases, such as cancer,
diabetes, and heart disease. 134 Moreover, HIV/AIDS has been
particularly prevalent in minority populations, including homosexual
This
men, injection drug users, and women of color. 135
marginalization of people with HIVI AIDS seeps into the medical
world, often affecting medical services. 136 For women, especially
women of color, social determinants of health play a large role in
both access to and choice of health care. 137
According to the World Health Organization (WHO):
The social determinants of health are the conditions in
which people are born, grow, live, work and age, including
the health system. These circumstances are shaped by the
distribution of money, power and resources at global,
national and local levels ... [and] are mostly responsible for
health inequities-the unfair and avoidable differences m
health status seen within and between countries. 138
Social determinants of health are evident in the United States, where,
according to a state-by-state study,
[w]omen of color fared worse than White women across a
broad range of measures . . . and in some states these
disparities were quite stark. Some of the largest disparities
were in the rates of new AIDS cases, late or no prenatal

134.
135.

136.

137.

138.

Motoko Y. Lee et al., Victim-Blaming Tendency Toward People with AIDS Among
College Students, J. Soc. PSYCHOL., June 1999, at 300 (citing surveys in which people
blamed the victims of AIDS for contracting the virus through behavior).
See Herek et al., supra note 117, at 371.
Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Cases of HIV Infection and AIDS in the U.S.
and Dependent Areas, 2007, HIV/AIDS SURVEILLANCE REP., 2009, at 14, 26, http://
www.cdc.gov/hiv/topics/surveillance/basic.htrn (last visited Apr. II, 20 I 0).
See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Texas Orthopaedic Surgeon
to Provide Individuals Living with HIV/AIDS Equal Access to Services (Oct. 16,
2009), http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2009pres/l 0/200910 16a.html (last visited Apr.
11, 2010).
"Health disparities in HIV/AIDS, viral hepatitis, STDs and TB are inextricably linked
to a complex blend of social and economic determinants that influence which
populations are most severely affected by these diseases." Memorandum from U.S.
Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Human
Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) Prevention Projects for Cmty.-Based Orgs. 9-10,
(last
http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/topics/funding/PS I 0-1 003/pdf/PS 10-1003 _FOA.pdf
visited Mar. 9, 2010).
World Health Org., Social Determinants of Health, http://www.who.int/social_
determinants/en/ (last visited Mar. 9, 2010).

2010] "Substantially Limited:" Women Living With HIV/AIDS

409

care, no insurance coverage, and lack of a high school
diploma. 139
Hence, many women of color find themselves in precarious health
care situations, sometimes in the crossroads of HIVIAIDS and
reproduction. While appropriate medical care is the conceivable
solution, navigating the health care system often proves difficult.
A power dynamic exists between many patients and their
physicians; patients often defer to their physicians' opinions
regarding medical issues because of their physicians' education and
expertise. 140 This relationship, while usually beneficial, can become
detrimental in certain circumstances. Social determinants of health
intensify this physician-patient power play:
In order to benefit from the medical advances that can
reduce perinatal transmission and extend health and life,
women need accurate, complete, and understandable
information that trustworthy professionals provide honestly
and respectfully. Women at greatest risk-including poor
women, substance users, sex workers, and survivors of
domestic violence-often have, at best, very fragile
connections to health care.
Many have experienced
disrespectful treatment from doctors, service providers, and
bureaucrats and rely on their peers for information about
HIV, other health issues, and medicine. 141
Women with HIVI AIDS often feel uncomfortable communicating
their needs to medical providers because of previous experiences
both inside and outside of doctors' offices. 142 Couple this situation
with pregnancy, and a woman with HIVIAIDS who is discouraged
from having a baby is severely disadvantaged in receiving adequate
care.

139. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., PlJITING WOMEN'S HEALTH CARE DISPARITIES ON THE MAP:
EXAMINING RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITIES AT THE STATE LEVEL 2 (2009),
http://www.kff.org/rninorityhealth/upload/7886.pdf (last visited Apr. 11, 20 I 0).
140. See Timothy E. Quill & Howard Brody, Physician Recommendations and Patient
Autonomy: Finding a Balance Between Physician Power and Patient Choice, 125
ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 763, 765-66 (!996).
141. CTR. FOR HIV LAW & PoL'Y, supra note 90, at 4.
142. See id.
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Some women living with HIVI AIDS reported being misinformed
by their doctors about the risks involved in procreating. 143 For
example, one woman recalled,
I only had really one week to decide what to do. I found out
I was HIV positive when I was 13 weeks pregnant. And in
1990, of course, they [doctors] said there was a 75% or 80%
chance oftransmission. That's baloney.
She went on to say that she decided to have an abortion, a
decision that she now regrets. 144
Other women have been in medical settings that have attempted to
shame them into choosing not to reproduce. 145 According to a study
concluded in 2000:
One mother whose baby tested negative spoke angrily about
the lack of sensitivity demonstrated at a local public health
office where HIV -positive women sought prenatal care:
"Don't ever have on your wall the poster with the little baby
that says she has her daddy's eyes and her mother's AIDS.
Every time I go into [the local public health unit] and it is
hanging up, I want to rip it off the wall. Don't you think we
have enough guilt that they need to walk in and see that?" 146
As comments such as these indicate, the lack of helpful and accurate
information for women living with HIVIAIDS, combined with the
stigma surrounding HIVI AIDS and reproduction, creates a
paradoxical and uncomfortable situation for women living with
HIVIAIDS. 147
In addition to stigma, some medical professionals have little
experience treating HIVI AIDS and therefore are unaware of which
protocol to follow when addressing HIVI AIDS and reproduction. 148
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

See Richard L. Sowell & Terry R. Misener, Decisions to Have a Baby by HIVlnfected Women, 19 W. J. OF NURSING RES. 56, 63 (1997).
!d. at 62 (alteration in original).
See Ingram & Hutchinson, supra note 127, at 122.
!d. (alteration in original).
See supra notes 143--45 and accompanying text.
The American Congress of Obstetricians and Gynecologists has provided
recommendations to obstetricians and gynecologists, but there is no uniform protocol.
See The American Congress of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, Routine Screening
Welcome,
http://www.acog.org/departments/dept_notice.cfm?recno=39&bulletin=
4617 (last visited Mar. 9, 2010) [hereinafter Routine Screening Welcome]; The
American Congress of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, Perinatal Welcome,
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Since no specific framework is required, an obstetrician could treat a
pregnant patient without following the medically accepted protocol
for testing a mother for HIV at various stages in her pregnancy. 149 In
addition, if a pregnant woman is known to have HIV/AIDS, some
medical professionals are not equipped with enough information to
treat her. 150 While the American Congress of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists (ACOG) has recently provided recommendations to
obstetricians and gynecologists (OB/GYNs) regarding routine HIV
testing 151 and perinatal transmission prevention, 152 no mandatory
protocol exists. 153 This lack of a standard could prove harmful to a
patient whose doctor does not follow these recommendations.
In order to improve reproductive services for women living with
HIV/AIDS, the ACOG, the American Medical Association (AMA),
and medical schools should emphasize collaboration between the
OB/GYN and HIV/AIDS specialties. Specifically, OB/GYNs, while
now merely encouraged to provide opt-out HIV testing, 154 should be
required to do so. This testing should be combined with physicianpatient pre- and post-test counseling and a full discussion of what
testing entails. 155 Likewise, HIV/AIDS specialists should have optout pregnancy counseling for all women of reproductive age. The
opt-out nature of these practices would prevent women from feeling
forced to succumb to mandatory protocols, but it would also, over
time, solidify the idea that testing and counseling are not

149.

150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

155.

http://www.acog.org/departments/dept_notice.cfm?recno=39&bulletin=3527
(last
visited Mar. 9, 2010) [hereinafter Perinatal Welcome].
Telephone Interview with Maryellen Grysewicz, RN, C, ACRN, Children's Hospital
of Philadelphia and former public health HIV/AIDS nurse (Dec. 8, 2009) (discussing
how a mother gave birth to a child with HIV because she contracted HIV while
pregnant and was not tested regularly throughout her pregnancy).
/d.
Routine Screening Welcome, supra note 148.
Perinatal Welcome, supra note 148.
See Routine Screening Welcome, supra note 148; Perinatal Welcome, supra note 148.
Press Release, The American Congress of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, Routine
HIV Screening Recommended for All Women, Regardless of Individual Risk Factors
(Aug. 1, 2008), http://www.acog.org/from_home/publications/press_releases/nr08-0 108-l.cfrn (last visited Mar. 9, 2010) [hereinafter Routine HIV Screening
Recommended for All Women].
The most sensitive type of HIV test is called the ELISA test. It detects HIV
antibodies in the blood and is 99.5% sensitive. A positive ELISA test should be
confirmed by a second test called the Western Blot. In addition, newer rapid testing
technologies are beginning to emerge. These tests can be done with a saliva sample,
and preliminary results could form in as little as twenty minutes. See CTR. FOR HIV
LAW & PoL'Y, supra note 90, at 11-12.
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extraordinary measures that only apply to marginalized
communities. 156
The coordination between HIVI AIDS and OBIGYN education
would also increase awareness that a distinct crossover field exists in
medicine today.
It would decrease the stigma surrounding
HIVI AIDS and reproduction because it would be treated as a more
commonplace issue in the medical world. Ultimately, a doctor has a
duty to treat his or her patient, including a patient with an ADArecognized disability, unless the patient presents a direct threat to
others. 157 While a medical provider certainly should use his or her
discretion based on medical expertise, purported "discretion" based
on personal opinions or moral judgments should be viewed as
discrimination.
Professional medical associations and medical
schools should emphasize this distinction to prevent further
discrimination against HIVI AIDS and reproduction.
VI. NEW LEGAL FRAMEWORK: THE ADA AMENDMENTS
ACT OF 2008

A.

Legislative Intent to Include HIV/AIDS

Congress realized that the Supreme Court was narrowing the ADA
in a way that undermined its legislative intent, and it therefore
decided to broaden the Act by passing the ADAAA. 158 Similar to the
provisions of the ADA, to have a disability under the ADAAA, a
person must have: (1) an impairment that (2) substantially limits (3)
one or more major life activities. 159 When discussing the purposes of
the ADAAA, Congress cited a litany of Supreme Court cases that
interpreted the ADA much more narrowly than Congress had
intended. 160 It referred to cases such as Sutton v. United Air Lines,
Inc. 161 and Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v.
Williams, 162 stating that their holdings "have narrowed the broad
156. See id. at 4-5; Routine HIV Screening Recommended for All Women, supra note
154.
157. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(3) (2007); Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 648-49 (1998)
(discussing the ADA's "direct threat" provision).
158. ADA Amendments Act of2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008) (codified
as amended at42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2009)).
159. ADAAA § 3(1); 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).
160. ADAAA § 2(a)(4)-(7).
161. 527 u.s. 471 (1999).
162. 534 U.S. 184 (2002). The Toyota Court narrowed the definition of "substantially
limited" to mean "prevents or severely restricts." /d. at 198. Toyota was decided by
the same Supreme Court Justices as Bragdon, implying that when the Bragdon Court
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scope of protection intended to be afforded by the ADA, thus
eliminating protection for many individuals whom Congress intended
to protect." 163 However, Congress did not expressly mention
Bragdon at all. This exclusion by no means indicates that Congress
meant to exclude HIVI AIDS from being considered a disability under
the ADA. In fact, as Congresswoman Tammy Baldwin stated:
Although the ADA clearly intended to protect people living
with HIV[,] . . . all too often whether or not they could
proceed with their discrimination claim has turned on the
court's view of evidence as to their child-bearing ability and
intentions: highly personal, intimate matters that are
completely unrelated to the discrimination they
experienced. 164
Also, the House Education and Labor Committee stated that the
ADAAA will likely "affect cases such as US. v. Happy Time Day
Care Center in which the courts . . . recogniz[ ed], among other
things, that 'there is something inherently illogical about inquiring
whether' a five-year-old's ability to procreate is substantially limited
by his HIV infection." 165 Hence, a new disability framework
emerged.
B.

New Definition ofDisability

Prior to the passage of the ADAAA, a commentator proposed that,
"[r]ather than having the Court over-extend the ADA in such a
fashion as to disable it and open it up to many novel claims, it would
be far better for Congress to pass legislation which clearly prohibits
discrimination against those with HIV infection." 166 The ADAAA
did just that, introducing promising provisions that, if interpreted

163.
164.
165.

166.

held that HIV substantially limited the plaintiff's ability to reproduce, it meant that
HIV "prevents or severely restricts" a person's ability to reproduce. See id; see also
Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 647. Therefore, Toyota's narrowing of the term "substantially
limited" further emphasized the Bragdon Court's belief that a woman with HIV/AIDS
should not reproduce.
ADAAA § 2(a)(4).
154 CONG. REc. H8297 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 2008) (statement of Rep. Baldwin).
H.R. REP. No. 110-730, pt. 1, at 13-14 (2008) (Comm. on Educ. & Labor) (citing
United States v. Happy Time Day Care Ctr., 6 F. Supp. 2d 1073, 1080 (W.D. Wis.
1998)).
Ajalat, supra note 48, at 768.
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appropriately by the courts, could protect people living with
HIVIAIDS without relying on the reproduction standard. 167
Specifically, the ADAAA's provisions categorize HIVIAIDS as a
disability, even when asymptomatic, because it is "episodic or in
remission ... [and] would substantially limit a major life activity
when active." 168 While "reproductive functions" are considered
"major life activities" under the ADAAA, 169 "major bodily
function[s] ... of the immune system" are considered "major life
activities" as well. 170 The very nature of HIVIAIDS involves
suppressing a person's immune system. 171 Therefore, HIVI AIDS,
even in the asymptomatic HIV phase, is clearly considered a
disability under the ADAAA solely because it substantially limits
functions of the immune system. 172 By laying out these provisions,
Congress gives courts a less specific, less stigmatizing, and more
inclusive reason why people with HIVI AIDS should be protected
under the ADA.

C.

EEOC Regulations: HIVIAIDS Essentially a Disability Per Se

While the ADAAA makes it relatively clear that HIVI AIDS meets
the definition of a disability, the question remains whether courts will
more consistently determine that HIVIAIDS is a disability per se.
Currently, defining HIVIAIDS as a disability per se would broadly
protect all people living with HIVI AIDS from discrimination,
regardless of whether or not they are able-or have chosen-to
reproduce. 173
As an alternative to statutory or judicial
167.

168.
169.
170.
171.

172.

173.

See Happy Time Day Care, 6 F. Supp. 2d at 1080 (indicating that there is something
"inherently illogical" about inquiring whether a five-year-old's ability to procreate is
substantially limited by his HIV infection).
ADAAA § 3(4)(0).
ADAAA § 3(2)(B). "[R]eproductive functions" are considered "major bodily
functions," which are included in the list of"major life activities" in the ADAAA. /d.
/d. "[F]unctions of the immune system" are considered "major bodily functions,"
which are included in the list of"major life activities" in the ADAAA. Id.
See Dep't of Health and Human Servs.: Ctrs. for Disease Control and Prevention,
Basic Information: HIV, available at http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/topics/basic/index.htm
#hiv ("HIV finds and destroys a type of white blood cell (T cells or CD4 cells) that
the immune system must have to fight disease.").
See EMILY A. BENFER, AM. CONSTITUTION Soc'y FOR LAW & POL'Y, THE ADA
AMENDMENTS ACT: AN OVERVIEW OF RECENT CHANGES TO THE AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES ACT 7 (2009), available at http://www.acslaw.org/files/Benfer%20ADA
AA_O.pdf.
154 CONG. REc. H8298 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 2008) (statement of Rep. Baldwin)
("Under the ADA Amendments Act, [people who are HIV/AIDS positive] will all be
assured legal protection [from] discrimination based on their HIV status, irrespective
of their child-bearing intentions .... ").
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modifications, 174 regulatory change seems to be the most feasible way
to accomplish this goal. 175 In the ADAAA, Congress expressly
granted the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC),
the Attorney General (under the Department of Justice), and the
Secretary of Transportation legally binding regulatory authority to
amend their regulations implementing the ADAAA. 176 Accordingly,
on September 23, 2009, the EEOC issued proposed regulations. 177 In
these new regulations, the EEOC specifically states that "major life
activities" include:
The operation of major bodily functions, including
functions of the immune system, special sense organs, and
skin; normal cell growth; and digestive, genitourinary,
174. Changing the statutory language of the ADA (and now the ADAAA), to include HIV
as a disability per se would be problematic for both practical and ideological reasons.
First, making such a blanket statement would hamper legislative and judicial
efficiency. Considering it takes years to push most bills through Congress, the lag
between introducing a new ADAAA standard and implementing it would not benefit
many people living with HIV today. See Burgdorf, supra note 109, at 253, 268
(discussing gaps in enforcement of the ADA and pending legislation). From a judicial
angle, it could take years for the Supreme Court to grant certiorari to a case in which it
could classify HIV as a disability per se, taking even longer for lower courts to follow
suit. See, e.g., Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 628-29 (indicating an approximate
four year gap between a dentist's refusal to treat an HIV patient and the Court's ruling
on how the ADA applied to the situation). Moreover, in light of rapid medical
advancements surrounding HIV/AIDS treatment, the issue might be moot by the time
Congress and the courts make changes. See CTR. FOR HIV LAW & PoL'Y, supra note
90, at 9 (discussing "improvements in HIV care").
175. See Burgdorf, supra note 109, at 261-62 (referencing epilepsy regulations endorsed
by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) as illustrative of how a
regulatory framework better realizes the intentions of Congress than the judicial
system, which has carved out exceptions to the definition of epilepsy as a per se
disability).
176. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 506, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008).
The Act states that:
"The authority to issue regulations granted to the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, the Attorney General, and
the Secretary of Transportation under this Act includes the
authority to issue regulations implementing the defmitions of
disability in section 3 (including rules of construction) and the
definitions in section 4, consistent with the ADA Amendments
Act of2008."
!d.
177. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 74 Fed. Reg. 48,431 (Sept. 23, 2009)
(to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630) (requesting that written comments on these
regulations be received by Nov. 23, 2009).
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bowel, bladder, neurological, brain, respiratory, circulatory,
cardiovascular,
endocrine,
hemic,
lymphatic,
musculoskeletal, and reproductive functions. For example,
kidney disease affects bladder function; cancer affects
normal cell growth; diabetes affects functions of the
endocrine system (e.g., production of insulin); epilepsy
affects neurological functions or functions of the brain; and
Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) and AIDS affect
functions of the immune system and reproductive functions.
Likewise, sickle cell disease affects functions of the hemic
system, lymphedema affects lymphatic functions, and
rheumatoid arthritis affects musculoskeletal functions. 178
While the EEOC is responsible for Title I of the ADA, as
amended, 179 the Department of Justice has yet to issue new
regulations to implement the ADAAA under other titles, including
Title Ill, Public Accommodations. 180 Because discrimination in
places of public accommodation, including medical settings, is
178. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 74 Fed. Reg. at 48,440 (emphasis
added).
179. Title I "prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of disability." 29 C.F.R.
app. § 1630 (2009).
180. The Department of Justice is responsible for issuing regulations for Title III, Public
Accommodations. See Dep't of Justice, ADA Title III Technical Assistance Manual
Covering Public Accommodations and Commercial Facilities, http://ada.gov/taman3.
html (last visited Mar. 9, 2010). However,
[o]n January 21, 2009, the Department of Justice notified the
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) that the Department
has withdrawn its draft final rules to amend the Department's
regulations implementing title II and title III from the OMB
review process.
This action was taken in response to a
memorandum from the President's Chief of Staff directing the
Executive Branch agencies to defer publication of any new
regulations until the rules are reviewed and approved by officials
appointed by President Obama. No final action will be taken by
the Department with respect to these rules until the incoming
officials have had the opportunity to review the rulemaking
record. Incoming officials will have the full range of rule-making
options available to them under the Administrative Procedure Act.
Withdrawal of the draft final rules does not affect existing ADA
regulations. Title II and title III entities must continue to follow
the Department's existing ADA regulations, including the ADA
Standards for Accessible Design.
Dep't of Justice, Proposed ADA Regulations Withdrawn from OMB Review,
http://www.ada.gov/ADAregswithdraw09.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2010).
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problematic, the Department of Justice's definition of disability
should be identical to the EEOC's definition, 181 including HIVIAIDS
in a list of disabilities. Otherwise, courts might continue to interpret
the definition of disability narrowly, deciding that per se HIVIAIDS
disability protection should be limited to employment cases and not
extending this protection to places of public accommodation.
D. ADAAA Expands "Regarded As'' Standard

If, for some reason, a person is not considered actually disabled
under the ADA, the ADAAA proposes another manner in which he
or she qualifies for ADA protection. 182 The 1990 ADA provided an
option for courts to decide that a person living with HIV has a
disability if he or she is "regarded as having ... an impairment [that
substantially limits one or more major life activities]." 183 The 2008
ADAAA expands that notion by adding,
[a]n individual meets the requirement of "being regarded as
having such an impairment" if the individual establishes that
he or she has been subjected to an action prohibited under
this Act because of an actual or perceived physical or mental
impairment whether or not the impairment limits or is
perceived to limit a major life activity. 184
Initially, the ADAAA's "regarded as" provision seems to be the
solution for how people living with HIVI AIDS can be protected from
discrimination without relying on the reproduction standard. 185 In a
sense, it could send a message that people living with HIVIAIDS are
not necessarily physically disabled, but that they should still be
protected against discrimination from people who view them as less
capable. 186 As the Happy Time Day Care court stated, "Congress
181. The EEOC currently defines "[d]isability" as: "(1) A physical or mental impairment
that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; (2)
A record of such impairment; or (3) Being regarded as having such an impairment."
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g) (2009).
182. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(2009).
183. /d. § 12102(2) (1990) (emphasis added).
184. /d.§ 12102(3)(A) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1990)).
185. See id. § 12102(l)(C), (3)(A); see also discussion supra Part Ill.
186. See Mary Johnson, Letter to the Editor, Poverty is Scourge Behind Global AIDS
Epidemic, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 1998, at AlO (New York Edition), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/ 1998/07/ll/opinionll-poverty-is-scourge-behind-global-aidsepidemic-830585.html?scp=5&sq=bragdon%20v.%20abbott&st=cse.
The Letter
states:
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acknowledged that society's accumulated myths and fears about
disability and disease are as handicapping as are the physical
limitations that flow from actual impairment." 187 The "regarded as"
prong could be beneficial for many discrimination cases, but whether
it would adequately protect everyone living with HIVI AIDS, namely
women who want to reproduce, is a question future court cases will
likely determine.
Whereas the "regarded as" prong under the 1990 ADA allowed for
reasonable accommodations to be provided to someone who is
thought to have a physical or mental disability, the ADAAA makes it
clear that individuals who are "regarded as" disabled are no longer
Professor Chai
entitled to any reasonable accommodation. 188
Feldblum and collaborators at the Georgetown University Law

Those of us who pushed for passage of the Americans with
Disabilities Act were comforted that the law would cover those
who were, to quote the law, "regarded as having a disability" and
facing discrimination as a result. The point wasn't what kind of
disability they had; it was that they were considered disabled and
being treated shabbily as a result.
Then came Bragdon v. Abbott, all the way to the Supreme Court.
To the nonlawyers among us, it seemed the part of the law that
applied in this case was that "regarded" bit: Dr. Randon Bragdon,
a dentist, regarded Sidney Abbott of Bangor, Me., who has H.l.V.,
as disabled; that's why he wouldn't treat her.
But no; everyone's off discussing whether having reproductive
problems makes one "disabled." The point shouldn't be what the
disability is-or even if Ms. Abbott was disabled: the point should
be that she was regarded as disabled and denied a service as a
result. How did things move away from this clear point?

!d.
187. United States v. Happy Time Day Care Ctr., 6 F. Supp. 2d 1073, 1083 (quoting
School Bd. Of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 284 (1987) (discussing the
intent of the "regarded as" test under the Rehabilitation Act)).
188. The ADAAA states:
A covered entity under subchapter I of this chapter, a public
entity under subchapter II of this chapter, and any person who
owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public
accommodation under subchapter III of this chapter, need not
provide a reasonable accommodation or a reasonable modification
to policies, practices, or procedures to an individual who meets
the definition of disability in section 12102(1) of this title solely
under [the "regarded as" prong].
Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 6(a)(l), 122 Stat. 3553 (2008) (codified as amended at 42
u.s.c. § l220l(h) (2009)).
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Center Federal Legislation and Administrative Clinic discuss the
reasoning behind this decision:
[W]hen one reviews the facts of the cases in which
reasonable accommodations have been found to be required
under the ["regarded as"] prong, it seems clear that the
plaintiffs in those cases should have been covered under the
first prong of the definition of disability. Hopefully, that
will be the case now under the [ADAAA] .... 189
This expectation seems like a plausible outcome, but the concept has
yet to be tested in the courts.
While removing the reasonable accommodation requirement to the
expanded "regarded as" prong is theoretically logical, the omission
might give courts an opportunity to deny reasonable accommodations
to some people with perceived impairments who might need them.
For example, in the HIV/AIDS and reproduction context, a court
might decide that a pregnant woman with asymptomatic HIV is not
actually disabled but "regarded as" impaired. It might also find that
an ART, such as in vitro fertilization, is considered a reasonable
accommodation to help the woman conceive without placing her
partner at risk of transmission. It therefore might decide that the
woman is not entitled to the reasonable accommodation of an ART
because she is merely "regarded as" impaired. While ARTs are
medical procedures that should not be considered reasonable
accommodations, a court attempting to narrow the broadened scope
of the ADAAA might choose to interpret the statute in such a
manner. This scenario, while hopefully never a reality, reveals the
potential problems the "regarded as" standard could present in the
HIV/AIDS and reproduction context.

E.

Progress, but No Mention ofBragdon

Congress made it clear that the intention of the ADA and the
ADAAA was and is to protect people living with HIV/AIDS from
It also revealed the logical dissonance the
discrimination. 190
189. Chai Feldblum, Kevin Barry & Emily A. Benfer, The ADA Amendments Act of 2008,
13 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 187, 237-38 (2007).
190. See 154 CONG. REc. H8296 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 2008) (Background on Legislation);
see also 154 CoNG. REc. H8297-98 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 2008) (statement of Rep.
Baldwin) ("Under the ADA Amendments Act, [people who are HIV/AIDS positive]
will all be assured legal protection [from] discrimination based on their HIV status,
irrespective of their child-bearing intentions .... ").
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reasoning behind Bragdon poses for cases such as Happy Time Day
Care, where the person being discriminated against was a five-yearold boy who was nowhere near reproductive age. 191 However,
although Congress hinted at the problematic reproduction-based
HIVI AIDS disability standard, it did not explicitly address the
Bragdon standard's potential for stigma.
Therefore, Congress
implicitly condoned the reproduction standard as one possible
criterion by which to decide HIVIAIDS cases. 192 In doing so,
Congress did not attempt to counteract the stigmatizing nature of
Bragdon.
While time will tell whether or not Congress needed to be more
explicit to refocus HIVIAIDS-related ADA jurisprudence, an
unambiguous reference to Bragdon could have sent a message that
went beyond the simple irrationality of the reproduction standard and
directly attacked the discriminatory view of HIVIAIDS and
reproduction. Although the ADAAA is a progressive step that
presents a potential solution, Congress could have quashed some
stereotypes by simply mentioning that the Bragdon standard is
narrow and outdated. Instead, Bragdon's legal authority lingers, and
the stigma surrounding women with HIVIAIDS and reproduction
remams.
VII. CONCLUSION: WHERE THE LAW SHOULD MEET
REALITY
Women with HIVIAIDS often live difficult and marginalized lives,
despite many medical advances. The law could, and should, serve as
a powerful tool to protect their rights and to fight damaging
stereotypes.
Unfortunately, while medical and public health
authorities have modified their recommendations surrounding
HIVIAIDS and reproduction to reflect advances in treatment and
understanding, the legal world has been slow to follow suit. As
discussed, post-Bragdon case law has relied on the Bragdon Court's
rationale that having HIVIAIDS substantially limits a woman's
ability to reproduce. 193 Lower courts' reliance on the reproduction
standard not only has resulted in inconsistent results for HIVIAIDSbased ADA cases, but it also has perpetuated the belief that women
with HIVI AIDS should not reproduce. 194
191. See Bmgdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 624-26 (1998); Happy Time Day Care, 6 F.
Supp. 2dat 1074-75.
192. See supra text accompanying notes 168-69.
193. See supra Part II.
194. See supra Parts II, IV-V.
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When passing the ADAAA, Congress attempted to rectify courts'
narrow applications of the ADA. Congress unequivocally intended to
make the ADAAA as broad as possible, expanding provisions under
which HIVIAIDS could be considered a disability, unrelated to
reproduction. 195 Also, by granting regulatory authority to the EEOC,
the Attorney General, and the Department of Transportation,
Congress enabled regulatory bodies to create binding provisions that
include HIVIAIDS in a list of diseases considered disabilities per
se. 196 In addition, by expanding the "regarded as" prong, Congress
provided another mechanism by which people with HIVIAIDS could
argue that they are protected under the ADA. 197
Despite this progress, however, Congress neglected to mention
Bragdon explicitly. 198 Therefore, it did not do all it could have done
to overcome the stereotypes surrounding HIVI AIDS and
reproduction. Under the new provisions of the ADAAA, a woman
with HIVIAIDS may have more effective recourse against
reproduction-related discrimination because the standard under which
she is "disabled" no longer undercuts the services she wants to
receive. 199 However, by not mentioning the Bragdon reproduction
standard's potential for stigma, Congress did not address the
stereotype that HIVIAIDS substantially limits a woman's ability to
reproduce. While this notion is sometimes true, it is not a full
reflection of reality. By failing to confront the Bragdon standard
directly, Congress left open the possibility that courts will not revisit
the reproduction standard.
While the general perception of HIVIAIDS has improved, women
still encounter discrimination in medical and social settings. 200 The

195. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325 § 3(2)(B), 3(4){0), 122 Stat.
3553 (2008) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2009)); see supra Part VI.B.
(discussing Congress's intent to include HIV/AIDS within the definition of disability
beyond the reproduction standard).
196. ADAAA § 506 (Rule of Construction Regarding Regulatory Authority); see supra
Part VI. C.
197. See supra Part Vl.D.; 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(3)(1)(C), 12102(4)(A) (2008) ("[A]n
individual meets the requirement of 'being regarded as having such an impairment' if
the individual establishes that he or she has been subjected to an action prohibited
under this Act because of an actual or perceived physical or mental impairment
whether or not the impairment limits or is perceived to limit a major life activity.").
198. Seegenera/ly42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213.
199. See id. § 12188 (2008) (stating that a person who claims discrimination in a place of
public accommodation [under Title III of the ADA] may seek remedies under 42
U.S.C. § 2000a-3 [Civil Actions for Preventive Relief]).
200. See supra Part V.
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stigma surrounding HIVI AIDS and reproduction has contributed to
potential public health dangers. 201 Fearing judgment, women with
HIVI AIDS still feel discouraged from taking precautions to prevent
partner and perinatal transmission. 202 They therefore might forego
seeking proper medical care, increasing the chance of transmitting
HIV.
Looking forward, courts may well interpret the ADAAA broadly,
as Congress intended. If they do so, the law surrounding HIVIAIDS
and discrimination will become a more constructive force for
changing the perception of women with HIVI AIDS who choose to
reproduce. Despite their physical impairment, these women should
be able to exist in a reality where they are not "substantially limited"
in making reproductive choices free from stigma. Legal changes will
hopefully lead to a wider acceptance of women's reproductive
choices, allowing them to emerge from marginalized communities
and to live empowered lives.

201. See supra Part IV.
202. See supra Parts Ill, V.

